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ABSTRACT
THE EFFECTS OF HUMAN CAPITAL, SOCIAL CAPITAL, AND
THE ETHNIC ENCLAVE ECONOMY ON THE EARNINGS OF IMMIGRANTS
(THE CASE OF THE MARIEL CUBAN EMIGRES)
May 2002
TODD MACEGAN WEST
B.A. ELON COLLEGE
M.A. GEORGIA SOUTHERN UNIVERSITY
Directed by: Professor William L. Smith
This thesis analyzes the extent to which an enclave economy affects the earnings of
immigrants compared to that of human and social capital. Ordinal Least Squares (OLS) multiple
regressions are used to compare the degree of effects of independent variables on earnings: the first
equation is the baseline model for the enclave economy, the second incorporates human capital, and
the third incorporates social capital. The dependent variable is monthly earnings. The independent
variables include (1) a set of control variables, (2) the primary and enclave labor-markets, and (3)
human and social capital characteristics. Findings show that an enclave economy has a far less
extensive and significant effect on immigrants' earnings than human and social capital. The analysis
also reveals that sex and hours worked per week affect immigrants' earnings to a much greater extent
than an enclave economy.
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Chapter I
Introduction
Purpose
In much of the research on immigrant enclaves, one viewpoint is that employment in an
enclave economy provides earnings that (1) reflect the true value of past human capital investments
and (2) are equivalent to or even higher in amount than that of similar work for nonimmigrants in the
general economy. These positions are not totally substantiated (Light & Gold, 2000). Zhou and Logan
(1989) for instance, find positive earning-returns to human capital for immigrants both inside and
outside the enclave economy. Kim (1999) notes the salience of social capital in the success of
immigrant proprietors. It is the thrust of this thesis then to determine (1) whether the effect of human
capital on earnings is in fact only relevant in the enclave economy; and (2) whether and to what extent
social capital affects the earnings of immigrants.
Literature Review
Segmented labor-market and ethnic solidarity theories are the dominant conceptual
explanations of immigrant labor-market participation. Segmented labor-market theory builds on dualeconomy theory (c.f, Averitt, 1968, Galbraith, 1971) to explain the socio-structural characteristics of
capitalist labor-markets. This model states that advanced capitalist economies contain two segmented
labor-markets: (1) a primary labor-market and (2) a secondary labor-market (Edwards, 1975; Gordon,
1972). "The primary labor-market... is characterized by stable work conditions, higher wages, scarce
skill specifications and internal labor-markets that provide ladders of success within the firm" (Sanders
& Nee, 1987, p. 746). In contrast, "high turnover rates, low-paying, low-skill jobs that lack structured
opportunities for promotion within the firm" characterizes the secondary labor-market (Sanders & Nee,
1987, p. 746). According to segmented labor-market theory, the employment structure of laissez-faire
economies necessitates the maintenance of surplus pools of unskilled immigrant-laborers to fill the
most undesirable sectors of the secondary labor-market (Burawoy, 1976; Piore, 1979; Sassen-Koob,
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1978). The theory further states that during economic recessions these immigrant-laborers are the first
to be laid off. Accordingly, unskilled immigrants often experience menial work and joblessness in
perpetual succession (Bluestone, 1979; Doeringer & Piore, 1971).
A separate but related set of structural theories termed ethnic-solidarity theories suggests that
in order to surmount the limitations to economic mobility in the secondary labor-market, immigrants
rationally construct commercial alliances based on ethnic solidarity in which capital assets, and
commercial skills can be shared and invested without outside interference (Cohen, 1969; Cummings,
1980; Kim, 1981; Light, 1972; Olzak & Nagel, 1986; Padilla, 1987; Portes & Bach, 1985). In
explaining Chinese (HA) business development in California, Terry E. Boswell (1986, p. 364) points
to this interaction between fiscal immobility in the secondary labor-market, ethnic solidarity, and the
subsequent formation of economic alliances of immigrants:
Segregated from . . . skilled trades, and crowded into low-wage agricultural or sweatshop
work, Chinese immigrants often tried to escape the wage system entirely . . . Where
segregation produced sizable Chinese communitfies], Chinese merchants were at an
advantage over outsiders due to location, ethnic loyalty, and access to traditional Chinese
products.
The results of Bonacich and Modell's (1980) research on early Japanese (frl A) settlers in California
also indicate interconnections between limitations to economic mobility, ethnic solidarity, and the
creation of immigrant commercial-alliances. Some scholars (e.g., Bonacich, 1973; Bonacich &
Modell, 1980; Gold, 1988; Light, 1980; Min, 1996; Schermerhorn, 1970; Yoon, 1997) maintain that
the migratory patterns of certain itinerant immigrant-cohorts promote reactive-solidarity and economic
mobilization related to middlemen-minorities. In the U. S., city ghetto merchants such as the Italians,
Jews, Koreans and Cubans, and the Japanese in California, have been identified as models of the
middleman roles (Bonacich & Modell, 1980; Cobas, 1984; Kim, 1981). Ethnic-solidarity theorists
stress the connection between ethnic solidarity and ethnic resources to clarify why some immigrant
groups find financial realization despite the economic limitations of the secondary labor-market.
Expanding on segmented labor-market and ethnic solidarity theories, social scientists, such as
Kenneth Wilson and Alejandro Portes, have asserted that immigrant groups can overcome the
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economic barriers of the secondary labor-market through the creation of enclave economies. Wilson
and Fortes (1980, p. 302) formalize this argument in the enclave economy hypothesis:
Immigrant workers are not restricted to the secondary labor market. In particular, those
inserted into an immigrant enclave can be empirically distinguished from workers in both the
primary and secondary labor markets. Enclave workers will share with those in the primary
sector a significant economic return to past human capital investments. Such a return will be
absent among those in the "open" secondary labor market.
Fortes (1981, p. 291) defines the ethnic enclave as characterized by "immigrant groups which
concentrate in a distinct spatial location and organize a variety of enterprises serving their own ethnic
market and/or the general population. Their basic characteristic is that a significant proportion of the
immigrant work force works in enterprises owned by other immigrants." Fortes and Stepick (1985, p.
499) add that the enclave economy consists of "clusters of immigrant-owned enterprises which tend to
hire recent arrivals from the same nationality . . . [and] [which] possess certain characteristics [that]
open significant mobility opportunities for immigrant workers." Zhou (1992, p. 4) defines the ethnic
enclave as "a segmented sector of the larger economy, a partially autonomous enclave economic
structure constituting a distinct labor-market." Enclave economies can differ in size and division of
labor. Within large and highly stratified enclave economies, "it is possible for a newcomer to live his
life entirely within the confines of the community. Work, education, and access to ... a variety of
services can be found without leaving the bounds of the ethnic economy" (Fortes & Manning, 1986, p.
330). Further, there are no negative fiscal effects from the insular outlook of the enclave: Enclave
workers, unlike workers in the secondary labor-market, receive earnings to human capital
commensurate with workers in the primary labor-market.
To account for the advantages of the ethnic enclave, proponents of the enclave economy
hypothesis suggest that immigrant entrepreneurs promote and organize ethnic solidarity to create a
"unified system of vertical and horizontal integration," so that enclave firms can replicate some of the
economies of scale connected with core monopolistic firms (Wilson & Martin, 1982, p. 138). For that
reason, "the enclave resembles the center economy and should have many of the advantages which that
form of economy enjoys . . . [i.e.,] higher initial profits per unit of demand . . . higher levels of
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production in related industries (caused by the initial demand for the first industry's product) . . .
higher wages and . . . more jobs (again because of the initial demand)" (Wilson & Martin, 1982, p.
138-139). Ethnic solidarity additionally serves to provide entrepreneurs with low-cost, coethnic labor
and legitimizes paternalistic chains of command (Portes, 1981), which gives enclave firms favorable
work discipline and decreases the likelihood of unionization. Moreover ethnic networks can be drawn
on to generate captive-markets and open avenues for formal and informal capital acquisition, rendering
enclave firms particularly self-sufficient and resilient (Waldinger, 1993). These monopolistic features
also work to encourage fresh business starts for immigrant entrepreneurs because vertical ethnicintegration based on ethnic solidarity creates an orientation that encourages reciprocal obligations
between employers and employees:
If employers can profit from the willing self-exploitation of fellow immigrants, they are also
obliged to reserve for them those supervisory positions that open in their firms, to train them
in trade skills, and to support their eventual move into self-employment. It is the fact that
enclave firms are compelled to rely on ethnic solidarity and that the latter "cuts both ways,"
which creates opportunities for mobility unavailable in the outside (Portes & Bach, 1985, p.
343).
Numerous studies (e.g., Bach, 1980; Bach, Bach & Triplett, 1981; Bonacich & Modell, 1980;
Portes, 1981, 1982, 1984; Portes & Bach, 1980; Portes, Clark, & Bach, 1977; Portes & Manning, 1986,
1991; Portes, Parker, & Cobas, 1980; Semyonov, 1988; Waldinger, 1985; Wilson & Martin, 1982;
Wilson & Portes, 1980) support the premise that employment in an enclave economy facilitates
monetary advancement and protection from the secondary labor-market. Writing in Latin Journey,
which tracks the economic experiences of Cuban immigrants from 1973 to 1979, Portes and Bach
(1985) note the singular outcomes of Miami's emergent Cuban enclave economy. Within those sixyears, the number of Cubans who managed their own business rose from 8 percent to 21 percent, and
the most salient predictor of self-employment in 1979 was employment by another Cuban three years
prior. In addition, roughly 37 percent of the Cubans who were wage earners at the close of the study
worked for other Cubans, and employment in the enclave economy ensured higher returns to human
capital investments than employment in the secondary labor-market:
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In the enclave . . . [human capital investment] contributes to occupational gains very early in
the resettlement experience, with the magnitude of that advantage increasing over time ... No
such benefits are available, however, to refugees who become part of the secondary sector.
Instead, this latter group competes with other ethnic minorities in firms that provide few
rewards for individual skills and that tend to penalize past. . . achievement (Portes & Bach,
1985, p. 239).
Results from Yossi Shavit's (1992, p. 57) study of an Arab ethnic enclave in Israel also indicate that
working in an enclave economy produces higher returns to human capital investments. He writes,
"although the Arab economy offers a much more limited range of economic activities and occupations
when compared to the Jewish economy, Arab workers can attain occupations which are more
commensurate with their education in Arab-owned businesses." Nee and Nee's (1973) study of an
American Chinatown chronicles how Chinese-immigrants found monetary success through the
development of an enclave economy in San Francisco, California.
Not all social scientists (e.g., Gilbertson, 1995; Li, 1977; Zhou & Logan, 1989) however,
accept the idea that ethnic enclaves further the economic interests of immigrants. Maria Villar (1994,
p. 267) for instance asserts that differences in class backgrounds, long-term goals, and personal
orientations create antagonistic business environments that obstruct the creation of self-enclosed,
integrated enclave economies:
At present, there is the assumption that traditional ethnic bonds and reciprocal relationships
are sustained after displacement and settlement, but the social organization of immigrant
communities hardly mirrors that of home places ... In settlement places, old status symbols
may be challenged by prosperous individuals sharing "low" class mannerisms and
"backward" ideologies. Differences in social mores, values, and attitudes can make business
relationships difficult and obstruct collective activities, leading wealthy individuals viewed as
"inferior" to reaffirm their affiliation with home communities that recognize their
achievements and accord them respect and prestige. In this case, the business sector is not
only split by class backgrounds, but also by long-term goals and personal orientations.
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Conflict between vying street-gangs, secret societies, and coethnic political organizations can also
rouse destabilizing factionalism within the ethnic enclave (Armstrong, 1998; Gans, 1962; Suttles,
1968; Whyte, 1943). The struggle over the Chung Pak housing project in New York City's Chinatown
is a case in point. Here, the effect of intergroup factionalism almost undermined a critically needed
housing complex for Chinese senior citizens (cf. Sanders & Nee, 1987, p. 765).
Other social scientists suggest that ethnic solidarity, which the enclave economy hypothesis
predicts to be a critical factor in immigrant economic advancement, serves actually to restrict financial
headway. Enclave workers for instance may demand preferential treatment based on ethnic solidarity
but exhibit lax work attitudes, rendering enclave firms less profitable. This in turn necessitates the
eventual layoff of enclave workers to ease further monetary diminution. However, given that the
enclave economy depends on the perpetuation of captive markets to cloister it from the general
economy and to continue its increasing returns to scale—increased unemployment and the
accompanying loss of buying power can bring intense pressure to bear on the enclave economy's
survivability. In due course, enclave employers may find it more profitable and prudent to steer away
from an exclusive, coethnic labor force in favor of a more diverse and impersonal one. Labor
shortages can also hurt enclave economies. Shortages of labor often increase the negotiating power of
enclave workers to demand for better pay and benefits (Gold, 1994). In this event, as pay differentials
decrease and demands for extra privileges escalate, coethnic labor may become an employer's betenoire rather than a valuable asset, thereby diminishing the spirit of ethnic solidarity to open up
opportunities for economic mobility. A case in point, social scientist Ruben Rumbaut interviewed a
successful Vietnamese manufacturer of whose 300 workers—not one was Vietnamese. Rumbaut
found that the hiring practice of the manufacturer was due to the manufacturer's fear of "demands
[from] other Vietnamese" (Portes & Sensenbrenner, 1993, p. 1340). The results of Sanders and Nee's
(1987, p. 763-64) study of enclave economies suggest that because ethnic enclave fiscal development
depends on the retention of cheap labor, "[enclave] employers typically draw on ethnic solidarity to
enforce and maintain sweatshop conditions." Still more research by Bonacich (1978), Sanders, Nee and
Semau (1994) and Smith (1996) indicates that "the 'embeddedness' of economic activity in networks of
ethnic relations can trap immigrant-workers in patron-client relationships that bind them, in exchange
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for assistance at an early stage, to low-wage jobs" (Sanders & Nee, 1987, p. 764-75). The response to
Nee et al.'s (1994, p. 857) survey by a Chinese expatriate illustrates:
My relatives and friends told me[:] try not to work in Chinese circles . . . Once you plunge
yourself into it, you cannot free yourself, because you always face Chinese . . . And Chinese
people, if they are boss, they are more likely to squeeze all your labor. . . But if you don't
know English . . . you have to move only in a Chinese circle.
Employment in an enclave economy may not be economically advantageous to immigrants after all.
Data Analysis
In this thesis, my analytical strategy differs from that of earlier studies in one important
respect: I include key indicators of human and social capital1 into the analysis in order to better
understand how they affect immigrants' earnings relative to that of the enclave economy. 1 argue that
the idea of enclave economies providing income to human capital that is equivalent to or even greater
than that of similar work in the general economy is unsubstantiated as well as limited in scope.
Having stated the deficiency in ethnic enclave research, 1 use data from Alejandro Portes's
(1983-84) survey of Cuban emigres to analyze the extent to which an enclave economy affects the
earnings of immigrants compared to that of human and social capital. My structural equations are as
follows:
1) monthly earnings (earnings) = Bq + B, age +- B2 sex + B3 prime -f B4 enclave + B5 time
unemployed + B6 hours worked per week
2) monthly earnings (earnings) - Bq + B, age + Bj sex + B3 primary labor-market + B4 enclave
economy + B5 time unemployed + B6 hours worked per week + B7 years of Cuban education +
B8 number of U. S. courses + B9 duration of U. S. courses + B^ knowledge of U. S. + Bn
English language fluency + B12 number of U. S. jobs
3) monthly earnings (earnings) = B0 + B, age + B2 sex + B3 primary labor-market + B4 enclave
economy + B5 time unemployed + 85 hours worked per week + B7 years of Cuban education +
B8 number ofU. S. courses + B, duration ofU. S. courses + 6,0 knowledge of U. S. + B,,
English language fluency + 6,2 number of U. S. jobs + 6,3 U. S. relatives + B14 relatives' help
+ 8,5 same city kin + B|6 accompanying family + 6,7 interaction with non-Latino whites + B|8
church attendance + 8,9 private or public aid.

' Human capital is defined as the capacities, skills, and experience of an individual. Social capital is defined as features
of social organization, such as networks, norms and social trust that facilitate cooperation for mutual benefit (Putnam,
1995).

This empirical comparison, like all empirical comparisons, rests on the premise of "other things
being equaF' (Horan & Hargis, 1991). However, other factors such as time unemployed and hours
worked per week as well as demographics like age and sex have an effect on immigrants' earnings.
The four structural equations above integrate all of these points of relevance.

Chapter II
Methods
1 his thesis analyzes the extent to which an enclave economy affects the earnings of
immigrants compared to that of human and social capital. OLS multiple regressions are used to
compare the degree of influence of independent variables on earnings: the first equation is the baseline
model for the enclave economy, the second incorporates human capital, and the third incorporates
social capital. The dependent variable is monthly earnings. The independent variables comprise (1) a
set of control variables, (2) the primary and enclave labor-markets, and (3) human and social capital
characteristics.
Theoretical Perspective
Segmented labor-market theory assumes that advanced capitalist economies are split into two
sectors: the primary and secondary labor-markets. The former is characterized by high-wages and
upward economic mobility. Low-wages and economic immobility define the latter. Pursuant to
segmented labor-market theory, laissez-faire economies necessitate the continuance of surplus pools of
unskilled immigrant-laborers to fill the most undesirable sectors of the secondary labor-market. The
theory further states that cyclical unemployment hits these immigrant-laborers first. As a result,
unskilled immigrants often confront menial work and unemployment in perpetual succession.
Ethnic solidarity theories suggest that, in order to surmount the economic limitations of the
secondary labor-market, immigrant cohorts draw on ethnic solidarity to construct segmented sectors of
the larger economy called ethnic enclaves in which commercial activities can go on without outside
interference. Ethnic solidarity theories also predict that ethnic solidarity gives rise to an orientation
that promotes reciprocal obligations between employers and employees that facilitate economic
advancement for enclave workers.
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Data and Sampling
Data for this study come from Alejandro Portes's survey of Cuban immigrants, 1983-84, and
was acquired through the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR: Study
#9750). The sampling design consisted of stratified multistage area samples; the sampling strata are
political divisions within Dade County—the cities of Miami, Miami Beach, Hialeah, and
unincorporated Dade County. The universe was defined as households containing at least one Cuban
aged 18 to 60 who came to the U. S. in 1980 or after. Samples are not self-weighting as a
predetermined number of interviews were allotted to each stratum to assure adequate representation.
The weighted sample, adjusting for unequal probabilities of selection, is 300 Cubans. Because these
Cubans immigrated to the U. S. and settled in areas of high concentrations of Cuban businesses within
a span of just seven months, Portes's data fits the needs of this study (Portes & Stepick, 1985).
Operationalization of Variables
Dependent Variable
1 use monthly earnings as the indicator of immigrant earnings. Respondents were asked the
question: "In total, can you tell to me your actual income per month?" Answers were tabulated in
their substantive form. I receded "varying income" (9995), "not applicable" (9998), and "no data"
(9999) as "missing."
Independent Variables
There are two independent control-variables: age and sex. The former is coded in years: "1"
one, "2" two, etc. 1 calculated the respondents' ages by subtracting each of their years of birth from
19842 and then recoded "no data" (99) as "missing." The sampling frame consisted of respondents
whose ages ranged from 18 to 60 years. Sex is coded as "1" male, "0" female, and "9" missing.
I draw on the work of Portes and Stepick (1985)3 to define the primary, secondary, and
enclave labor-markets. Size of firm is employed as the main stratifying variable. The primary labormarket is defined as being composed of public sector employees and employees in companies whose
2

The codebook lists only respondents' birthdates. Interviews ran from 1983 to 84'. Thus some data of the variable age do
not match actual interview dates. This fact will not negate statistical tests of significance.
3
Portes and Stepick's (1985) study includes a fourth economic sector I incorporate this fourth sector into my definition
of the ethnic enclave for the reason that an enclave economy in part serves to protect illegal aliens from INS searches as
well as the costs of incorporation into the secondary labor market.
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owners are non-Cuban and which employ 100 workers or more. "Around 1980, the [approximate]
32,000 companies with paid employees in Dade County (Miami SMSA) averaged 14 workers per firm
. . . Relative to this average, firms with over 100 employees can he considered quite large and hence
more likely to reproduce the characteristics associated with primary markets" (Portes & Stepick, 1985,
p. 499). Companies whose owners are non-Cuban, and which employ fewer than 100 workers
constitute and define the secondary labor-market. The enclave economy is defined as consisting of
Cuban-owned firms, regardless of size, and all self-employed Cubans because "the principal of ethnic
solidarity requires ... that employers promote their workers as new positions become open within their
firms or support their eventual move into self-employment" (Portes & Stepick, 1985, p. 499).
Time unemployed is coded in months of unemployment: "0" never, "1" one month or less,
"60" over five years. I receded "not applicable" (98) and "not determined" (99) as "missing." The
number of hours worked per week is often associated with higher earnings. In this analysis, hours
worked per week will serve to protract the true effect of the respective labor-markets on earnings.
Hours worked per week is coded as "1" one, "40" forty, "70" seventy or more. I recoded "various
hours" (95) and "no data" (99) as "missing."
Years of Cuban education is coded as follows: "0" no school, "1" one, "2" two, "20" twenty.
I recoded "no data" (99) as "missing." Number of U. S. courses is coded as the sum total of school
courses completed: "0" no courses, "1" one, "2" two, "20" twenty. I recoded "no data" (99) as
"missing." Duration of U. S. courses is coded as the total number of months of completed school
courses: "0" no months completed, "1" one, "2" two, "60" sixty. 1 recoded "not determined" (99) as
"missing." I consider education to be a logical measure of human capital; in the ethnic enclave,
theoretically "education contributes to occupational gains very early in the resettlement experience,
with the magnitude of that advantage increasing over time" (Portes & Bach, 1985, p. 239).
The U. S. information index, or knowledge of U. S., is an 8-point scale of information about
U. S. society constructed by the sum of correct responses to twelve factual questions. Items range from
knowledge of political processes to various tax and credit concerns. The standardized alpha reliability
score (internal consistency) of the index, as measured by Cronbach's a, is .73 which indicates a clear
unidimensional structure and high reliability. The U. S. information index contributes to the analysis
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because it represents an important source of human capital needed by immigrants going to work in a
new country (Wilson & Portes, 1980).
The test of fluency in the English language, or English language fluency, is an 8-point scale
developed for use with immigrant samples that requests respondents to translate English words or
sentences into Spanish. The test is designed to measure English language comprehension at
elementary and junior-high school levels, and contains sentences such as "She is playing with her
dolls," and words like "Glance," and "Strife." The standardized alpha reliability score (internal
consistency) of the index, as measured by Cronbach's a, is .94 indicating a clear unidimensional
structure and high reliability. English language fluency is a key human capital resource: it has been
linked with the ability to advance in the increasingly service-oriented U. S. economy (Chiswick, 1992).
Number of U. S. jobs is coded as "1" one, "2" two, "8" eight or more. 1 receded "no data" (9)
as "missing." Number of U. S. jobs is used as an indicator for work experience. I chose work
experience as an indicator of human capital because more experience on the job increases the needed
knowledge and skills with which an immigrant can secure lucrative employment (Portes & Bach,
1985).
1 use seven variables to measure social capital, four of which involve direct family ties. The
first variable, called U. S. relatives, shows the number of relatives whom the respondent had in the U.
S. on his/her arrival: "0" no relatives, "1" one, "8" eight or more. I receded "not determined" (9) as
"missing." The second variable, called relatives' help, shows the extent to which respondents' relatives
helped the respondents to settle into U. S. society: "I" no help, "2" little help, "3" fair amount, and "4"
a great deal. I receded "not determined" (5) and "not applicable" (8) as "missing." The third variable,
called same city kin, concerns the number of relatives who live in the same city as respondents: "0" no
relatives, "I" one, "20" twenty. I recoded "not applicable" (98) and "not determined" (99) as
"missing." The fourth variable, called accompanying relatives, shows the number of relatives who
emigrated with the respondents to the U. S.: "0" alone, "1" one relative, "2" two, "8" eight or more. I
recoded "not determined" (9) as "missing."
The fifth measure of social capital relates to respondents' opportunities to interact with nonLatino whites: "1" few to none, "2" few, "3" fair amount, and "4" many opportunities. I recoded "no
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data" (9) as "missing." Church attendance has been associated with the formation of primary groups in
which relationships have emotional depth and endurance (Robertson, 1987); the extent to which
respondents attend church forms the sixth measure of social capital: "1" almost never attend church,
"2" once per year, "3" once per month, and "4" once per week. I receded "not determined" (9) as
"missing." As many people benefit from government programs and receive transfer income, such as
social security and Medicaid, the seventh variable measures time spent on public or private financial
aid: "0" no aid, "1" one month or less, "'60" sixty months. I recoded "not determined" (99) as
"missing."
Summary of Statistics
The response totals (N), minimum and maximums, means, medians, and standard deviations
for dependent and independent variables are shown in Table 1. Monthly earnings of respondents range
from $100 to $2870, with a mean of $799.53 (s.d.=$370.448) and a median of S716. Ages of
respondents range from 18 to 60; the mean age is 38.86 (s.d.=9.673) and the median, 39. The sample
contains a total of 300 respondents of whom 74.7 percent are male and 25.3 percent are female.
Of the 300 respondents, 51 work in the primary labor-market, 133 work in the ethnic enclave,
and 116 work in the secondary labor-market. Over a third of the respondents (39.1%) had never been
unemployed since arriving in the U. S.; the mean number of unemployed months is 5.76 (s.d.=8.520)
and the median, 2. Hours worked per week range from 9 hours to 70 hours, with a mean of 42.19
(s.d.= 10.065) and a median of 40.
Years of education in Cuba range from no years to 23 years of education, but most of the
respondents (78.3%) have no college education from Cuba. The number of educational courses taken
in the U. S. range from no classes to 12 classes with 60 percent of the respondents having taken no
classes; the mean number of courses taken is less than one (s.d.= 1.031) and the median number is 0. Of
the respondents, 59.7 percent indicate having had less than a month's worth of classroom instruction in
U. S. schools. Some 54 percent of the respondents have moderate to perfect knowledge of the U. S.;
the mean score on the U. S. information index is 3.87 (s.d.=2.093) and the median score is 4. Over half
(55%) of the respondents have no ability in the English language while only 4.3 percent have perfect
fluency; the mean score on the test of knowledge of the English language is 2.16 (s.d.=2.847), and the
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mean is 2.16. The preponderance of respondents (59.2%) has had between one and two jobs since
arriving in the U. S.; the mean number of U. S. jobs is 2.61 (s.d.= 1.736) and the median is 2.
Table I
Descriptive Statistics
Name

N

Mean

Median

Std. Dev.

Min

Mat

Valid

Missing

Earnings

289

11

799.53

716.00

370 448

100

2870

Age

299

1

38.86

39.00

9.673

18

60

Sex

300

0

.75

1.00

.436

0

1

Primary market

300

0

17

.00

.376

0

1

Enclave economy

300

0

.44

.00

.498

0

1

Time unemployed

294

6

5.76

2.00

8.520

0

42

Hours worked per
week

280

20

42.19

40.00

10.065

9

70

Years of Cuban
education

295

5

9.31

9.00

3.980

0

23

Number of U. S.
courses

300

0

.57

.00

1.031

0

12

Duration of U. S.
courses

300

0

4.16

.00

8.266

0

54

Knowledge of
U. S

300

0

3.87

4.00

2.093

0

8

English language
fluency

300

0

2.16

.00

2.847

0

8

Number of Lr. S.
jobs

296

4

2.61

2.00

1.736

1

8

U. S. relatives

300

0

3.34

3.00

2.756

0

8

Relatives' help

244

56

2.83

3.00

.998

1

4

Same city kin

300

0

4.93

2.00

6.875

0

40

Accompanying
family

300

0

1.90

1.00

2.097

0

8

Interaction with
non-l.atino whites

299

1

2.76

3.00

1.014

1

4

Church attendance

276

24

2.19

2.00

1.158

1

4

Private or public
aid

294

6

3.66

.00

7.666

0

60
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I he mean number of relatives at arrival is 3.34 (s.d.=2.756), and the median number is 3.
Exactly 81.3 percent ol the respondents had at least one relative in the U. S. prior to arrival. Of the
respondents, 70 indicate that their relatives helped them a "great deal," 97 indicate a "fair amount," 43
indicate a "little," and 34 indicate "no" help was given. Relatives residing in the same city range from
no relatives (26.3%) to 40 relatives (1%), with a mean of 4.93 relatives (s.d =6.875) and a median of 2.
Most of the respondents (81.7%) had fewer than 4 relatives who came to the U. S. with them. Only a
minority of respondents (37.1%) has few to no opportunities to interact with non-Latino whites, while
35.1 percent indicate a "fair amount" of opportunities and 27.8 percent, indicate "many." Of the
respondents, 109 indicate that they attend church "almost never," 59 indicate "once per year," 54 say
"once per month," and 54 more state "once per week." Just over half (54.1%) of the respondents have
had no public or private financial aid; 21 respondents have had 3 months of public or private aid, 17
respondents received 6 months, and 15 respondents, 12 months of public or private aid.

Chapter III
Findings
This section presents findings obtained from the three multiple regression equations
comparing the economic effects between an enclave economy and social/human capital4. Given the
limited sample size, the interpretation focuses on coefficients that are statistically significant at a . 1
level or lower. The statistical software package SPSS 10.1 was used to analyze the data.
Equation One
Linear multiple regression estimates are presented in Table II. The beta coefficients
(standardized) stand for the expected change in the dependent variable (monthly income) given a oneunit standard deviation increase in the independent variable net of all other variables. Equation one
contains two control variables: age and sex.
The adjusted coefficient of determination (adjusted r2) reflects the percentage of explained
variation in the dependent variable via the variation in the independent variables. The control variables
in the first equation explain about 18.1 percent of the total variance in monthly earnings. The net effect
of the two control variables and labor market indicators is moderately weak.
The sample for this thesis consists of 18 to 60 year old respondents. These ages represent the
years in which adults are most likely to work. While past empirical studies have found significant
correlations between additional years of age and increased earnings, the beta coefficient of age shows a
negative correlation between years of age and earnings. This finding however, is not significant. Age
may not be as important as other variables in determining the origins of immigrant earnings.
It is common knowledge as well as substantiated fact that on average men earn more money
than women (England, 1992). Factors such as occupational segregation by sex; discrimination;
women's multiple roles as workers, mothers, and wives; and lack of access to information networks
4

To account for the effect of sex on earnings, I ran two additional analyses—one with only men and the other with only
women. Because the parameter estimates (statistical results) of these additional analyses are so similar to the parameter
estimates of the original model, I do not report them here.
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and capital, together contribute to this subordinate status (Loo & Ong, 1987). As expected, the
significance level reveals a strong correlation between sex and earnings with men earning more than
women.
The primary and ethnic enclave labor-markets' beta coefficients are in the hypothesized
direction: employment in either labor-market generates more earnings than employment in the
secondary labor-market—but both statistics are insignificant. Time unemployed and hours worked per
week have strong significance levels, particularly hours worked per week (g < .0001). Time
unemployed has a negative effect on earnings; hours worked per week has a positive effect. It seems
that employment in one or another labor-market is less effective than labor-market characteristics on
generating earnings.
Table II
Equation One

B

Equation 1
Adjusted R2
(.181)

(Constant)

Std. Error

Beta

I

Sig,

2.284

.023

297.682

130.329

Age

-.684

2.117

-.018

-.323

.747

Sex

176.764

47.946

.212

3.687

.000

Primary market

53.456

57.550

.057

929

.354

Enclave economy

18.068

45.090

.024

.401

.689

Time
unemployed

-6.772

2.462

-.160

-2.751

.006

Hours worked per
week

9.969

2.141

.267

4.657

.000

a Dependent Variable: earnings
Equation Two
Linear multiple regression estimates are presented in Table III. Equation two contains all the
variables of equation one plus six human capital variables: years of Cuban education, number of U. S.
courses, duration ofU. S. courses, knowledge of U. S., English language fluency, and number of U. S.
jobs.
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The control and independent variables in the second equation explain about 24.5 percent of
the total variance in monthly earnings. The net effect of the two control variables, labor-market
indicators, and human capital variables is moderate.
In this equation, regression analysis reveals that sex is strongly related to greater earnings for
men. Conversely, the beta coefficient for age shows that each year of age has a positive effect on
earnings, a complete turnaround from the first equation. One possible explanation for this may be that
the indirect effects of unspecified independent variables in the first equation affected the accuracy of
its parameter estimates.
The primary and enclave labor-markets' beta coefficients show greater earnings compared to
the secondary labor-market, but their significant levels are weak. Time unemployed is negatively and
significantly associated with earnings. The effect of hours worked per week on earnings is positive and
significant.
Years of Cuban education has a positive effect on earnings, but this statistic is not significant.
In many cases, U. S. employers may not recognize a foreign education. As a result, even educated
immigrants must often reinvest in a U. S. education before ascending to their previous economic
positions. The low significance level of years of Cuban education may be the result of the general
disregard of foreign education by U.S. employers.
Number of U. S. courses has a positive effect on earnings, while duration of U. S. courses has
a negative effect. Neither variable is significant. The positive effect of number of U. S. courses is
expected; the negative effect of duration of U. S. courses is not. Perhaps duration of U. S. courses has a
negative effect because those immigrants who commit the least amount of time to acquiring the
maximum amount of human capital can be the first to reenter the labor-market and start earning money
(instead of spending it on classes).
Knowledge of U. S. and English language fluency are both positive, but only knowledge of U.
S. is significant. To check for multicollinearity, I dropped knowledge of U. S. from the regression
analysis to see whether it was a reflection of English language fluency. It was not a reflection:
parameter estimates remained constant for all variables. Perhaps the weak significance level of English
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language fluency can be explained by the fact that 44.3 percent of the immigrant sample works inside
the enclave economy.
Number of U. S. jobs is hypothesized to have a positive and significant effect on earnings—
but parameter estimates show the reverse. The secondary labor-market is divided into a two-tier wage
system in which entry-level positions rarely pay more than minimum wage. To the extent that
frictional unemployment steers some immigrants through continuous series of entry-level positions,
their incomes never rise above that of other more established immigrant workers.
Table III
Equation Two

Kauation 2

B

Std. Error

-57.390

156.851

Age

1.974

2.223

Sex

160.578

Primary market

Beta

I

Sig.

-.366

.715

.051

.888

.375

48.658

.193

3.300

.001

48.267

55.922

.052

.863

.389

Enclave economy

16.649

44.150

.023

.377

.706

Time unemployed

-4.319

2.514

-.101

-1 718

.087

1 lours worked per
week

11.037

2.155

.297

5.121

.000

Years of Cuban
education

7.676

6.672

.083

1.150

.251

Number of U. S.
courses

13.242

24.413

.039

.542

.588

Duration of U. S.
courses

-1 605

3.331

-.038

-.482

.630

Knowledge of
U. S.

37.452

11.517

.216

3.252

.001

English language
fluency

4.875

10.296

.038

.473

.636

Number of U S.
jobs

-9.965

12.358

-.046

-.806

.421

2

Adjusted R
(-245)

(Constant)

a Dependent Variable: earnings
Equation Three
Linear multiple regression estimates are presented in Table IV. Equation three contains all the
variables of equation two plus seven social capital variables: U. S. relatives, relatives' help, same city
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kin, accompanying family, interaction with non-Latino whites, church attendance, and public or private
aid.
The control and independent variables in the third equation explain about 28.9 percent of the
total variance in monthly earnings. The net effect of the two control variables, labor-market indicators,
human capital variables, and social capital variables is moderate.
Of the variables in equation two, only time unemployed and number of U. S. courses changed
significantly. While the beta coefficient of time unemployed remains negative, it is no longer
significant. Immigrants' social ties appear to affect earnings more than do either labor-markets or time
unemployed. Number of U. S. courses changed as well. Its beta coefficient shows a negative
correlation with earnings. Social capital again seems to be the strongest factor leading to lucrative
employment.
Of the four social capital variables of direct family ties, only accompanying family is
significant and positive. To test for multicolleniarity, I dropped accompanying family from the
regression equation to test whether it was related to same city kin. There was no relationship. To
explain these findings, consider that relatives who have lived in the U. S. for a long time may have
grown accustomed to U. S. society to the extent that they have more in common with mainstream
Americans than with their own relatives. As a result, initial interaction between new immigrants and
their more established relatives may be awkward and difficult. Also, consider that every person has a
need for emotional support, and the nuclear family is the primary social context in which this need can
be fulfilled (Robertson, 1987). The nuclear family then may be more economically valuable than
extended kin due to its emotional role in the life of the immigrant.
Results indicate a positive and significant relationship between interaction with non-Latino
whites and earnings. Many immigrants to the U. S. on arrival are unfamiliar with U. S. economic
institutions and laws. One way to offset this informational deficit is through interaction with nonLatino whites. Most non-Latino whites in the U. S. are native-bom citizens and for that reason have an
exhaustive knowledge of the U. S. economy. Immigrants who interact with non-Latino whites are
therefore in a position to leam first-hand the needed facts for economic success in the U. S.
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Church attendance has a positive but insignificant effect on earnings. This finding is curious;
at an institution such as the Church, it would seem that immigrants would find extensive support
networks. It may be that Church contacts are just too weak and far-removed from the realities,
pressures, and volatility of the job market to have a significant effect on the economic opportunities of
immigrants.
Public or private aid is negative and not significant. This indicates that there is no substitute
for being employed. Private or public aid may be useful for those immigrants who need it (e.g. the
handicapped), but if financial attainment is what an immigrant wants, that immigrant should not rely
solely on public or private aid to get it.
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Table IV
Equation Three

Equation 3
2

Adjusted R
(.289)

B
(Constant)

Std. Error

Beta

I

Sjjj.

-1.994

.048

-448.396

224.924

Age

2.479

2.787

.060

.889

.375

Sex

209.779

66.365

.243

3.161

.002

Primary market

2.385

71.221

.002

.033

.973

Enclave economy

15.691

55.253

.020

.284

.777

Time unemployed

-4.566

3.021

-.102

-1.511

.132

Hours worked per
week

12.652

2.795

.310

4.527

.000

Years of Cuban
education

8.065

8.248

.084

.978

.330

Number ofU. S.
courses

-.510

26.274

-002

-019

.985

Duration of U. S.
courses

-3.626

3.687

-.089

-.983

.327

Knowledge
of
U.S.W

34.375

15.092

.175

2.278

.024

English language
fluency

8.338

12.464

.064

.669

.504

Number ofU. S.
jobs

-15.922

16.535

-.064

-.963

.337

U. S. relatives

2.720

10.705

.018

.254

.800

Relatives' help

35.375

26.537

.091

1.333

.184

Same city kin

-.422

3.677

-.008

-.115

.909

Accompanying
family

37.712

12.711

.204

2.967

.003

Interaction with
non-Latino whites

45.125

25.449

.121

1.773

.078

Church attendance

11.442

22.239

.034

.515

.608

Private or public
aid

-3.907

3.271

-.080

-1.194

.234

a Dependent Variable: earnings

Chapter FV
Summary and Conclusions
Summary
This thesis analyzed the extent to which an enclave economy affected the earnings of
immigrants compared to that of human and social capital. The core of the study was a survey of 300
Cuban immigrants (1983-84), and the data were acquired through the Inter-university Consortium for
Political and Social Research (1CPSR: Study#9750). The sampling design consisted of stratified
multistage area samples; the sampling strata are political divisions within Dade County—the cities of
Miami, Miami Beach, Hialeah, and unincorporated Dade Country. The main findings of the study
show that the effect of working in a Cuban-owned firm and being self-employed has a less extensive
and significant effect on earnings than that of human and social capital. The analysis also shows that
(1) immigrant men earn on average more money than immigrant women, and (2) more hours worked
per week positively affect earnings to a greater extent than that of public sector work, and employment
in a large-scale, small-scale, or Cuban-owned firm. The results of this analysis do not support the view
that ethnic enclaves are special sectors of the economy in which immigrants can find superior earnings.
Conclusions
1 lours Worked Per Week
While both the availability and size of economic rewards are important to the preservation of
economic mobility, the availability of economic rewards is more important than the size of those
rewards (Sawhill & McMurrer, 1996). Consider for instance a job in which all employees work the
same number of hours at the same hourly-wage over a lifetime: in this case the actual distribution of
wealth from month to month is irrelevant—even when working-hours are not evenly divided per week.
On the other hand, at a job based on laissez-faire competition in which the number of hours worked per
week determines each laborer's total monthly earnings, the availability of working hours takes on a
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whole new importance: laborers, who work more hours per week, also receive more money. This
straightforward economic paradigm should not be ignored in studies of enclave economies.
Sex
Ethnic employment is an important part of the economic adaptation of many immigrant
women and men but most studies of enclave economies pass over comparisons of economic rewards
between them (Gilbertson, 1995). Indeed, 1 could find only three studies on ethnic enclaves relative to
this subject (cf. Gilbertson, 1995; Portes & Jenson, 1989; Zhou and Logan, 1989). There is much
evidence in support of the premise that women for various reasons receive less earnings than men
notwithstanding labor-market sectors: "Discrimination, occupational segregation, and work/family
conflicts result in lower wages and fewer opportunities for women, regardless of labor-market sector"
(Gilbertson, 1995, p. 658). It is a significant oversight in a discussion of enclave economies, and on
immigrant economic adaptation in general, to ignore a comparison of economic rewards between
women and men.
Accompanying Family
In Economy and Society, Max Weber (1978) explains that the family unit is the primary social
context in which personal bonds generate group solidarity in dealing with the outside society, sharing
of property, and consumption of everyday goods. "Due to this quality, the family unit comprises a
strategic resource in immigrant adaptation" (Sanders & Nee, 1987, p. 765). That is, the quality of
family solidarity serves as a valuable form of social capital in managing the uncertainties and
difficulties of adaptation to an alien society. Family solidarity may also work to motivate collective
action for economic advancement. A good example of this is the frequent strategy of immigrant
parents to utilize their children as sources of unpaid labor. Studies of enclave economies need to
consider the effects of family solidarity on the economic achievements of immigrants.
Knowledge of U. S.
In any given society there exists a class of elites who direct and control the major financial
and governmental institutions (Dye, 1983; Mills, 1956). These elites create laws and regulations as
well as promote norms and customs that serve to maintain a status quo that favors their own interests.
All immigrants at some time come into contact with these social, political, and economic constraints of
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the elite. Thus, those who want to have economic success in their new country must first familiarize
themselves with the sociopolitical and economic methods of the ruling order (Light & Gold, 2000).
Mayor John F. Street's proposal to build a baseball stadium in Philadelphia's Chinatown is a case in
point. Here the proposed $200 million ballpark to be built on parts of Chinatown set offan explosion
of public protest. Hundreds of Chinatown workers and shop-owners staged business shutdowns, held
demonstrations, attended city council meetings, sought signatures for petitions, and even gave away
"Save Chinatown" t-shirts. The Chinatown business community prevailed in the end, and Mayor Street
agreed to change the proposed site of the stadium to a location outside of Chinatown (c.f. Schmidt,
2000).
Interaction with Non-Latino Whites
In the early 19th century, social scientists looked to recognize and label consistent patterns in
the processes through which waves of various immigrant cohorts assimilated into U. S. society (e.g.
Wittke, 1952). These men viewed the four-part immigrant-adaptation/race-relations sequence of
"contacts, competition, accommodation, and eventual assimilation" to be a natural history of
immigrant/native interactions (Park, 1926, p. 196). The assumption that segregation has an inverse
effect on financial attainment comes from this perspective.
While I did not test assimilation theory as such, one of my findings conforms to its principles:
Cubans who interacted most with non-Latino whites received higher earnings. It is that finding plus the
fact that neither the primary nor enclave labor-markets show a significant effect on earnings that
suggests an interconnection between assimilation and economic advancement.

Chapter V
Discussion and Future Research
Discussion
Enclave economies continue to thrive and to emerge as distinct entities despite their economic
limitations. Why? For what other reason than economic gain would an immigrant group rationally
choose to set up a community of their own? The subsequent interpretation reflects what 1 believe may
be at least a part of the answer to this question.
Every society has a culture, and every culture is unique. Culture influences such important
facets of society as what and how foods are eaten, what specific languages are spoken, the types of
clothes people wear, and which holidays are celebrated. Culture also creates permanent bonds between
the various persons within its sphere of influence. Sometimes differences between two or more
cultures can trigger cultural clashes', what is acceptable in one culture may not be acceptable in another.
Also, the types of activities and sources of entertainment may drastically differ from one culture to the
next.
When immigrants leave their home countries to live abroad, they carry their native cultures
with them. To the extent that these immigrants find their traditional cultural values and norms to be
different from or at odds with that of their new society, they may come to wish for the comforts and
familiarities of their native culture as they had experienced them in their homeland. It is at this point
that immigrants come together to construct enclave economies to facilitate access to at least some of
the amenities of their former life.
Implications for Future Research
Future researchers may want to replicate this study through the Mexican community3 located
in Gainesville, Georgia. In Gainesville, this area is known as Little Mexico, and covers several square
miles in the southern end of the city. Surveys of Mexicans living in Gainesville could be conducted by

5

See Lavender and Gill, 2001
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means of a stratified multistage area sample with the sampling stratum being the Gainesville/Hall
census tract #11 (the respective district of Little Mexico) bounded by Browns Bridge Road, Mountain
View Road, and Southern Railroad lines. Within that stratum, areas with high concentrations of
Mexicans could be delimited and blocks within them selected as primary sampling units. Within each
delimited area, the researcher could select specific blocks through a predetermined simple randomsample procedure. The universe would be determined pursuant to the needs of the researcher. Within
each selected unit, an eligible Mexican would be interviewed and asked to provide background
information about him- or herself and about other members of the household.

REFERENCES
Armstrong, G. (1998). Football hooligans: Knowing the score. New York: Berg.
Averitt, R. T. (1968). The dual economy: The dynamics of American industry structure. New
York: Norton.
Bach, R. L. (1980, October). The new Cuban immigrants: Their background and
prospects. Monthly Labor Review. 39-46.
Bach, R. L., Bach, J., & Triplett, T. (1981). The flotilla 'entrants': latest and most
controversial. Cuban Studies, 11, (12), 29-48.
Berger, B. (1991). The culture of entrepreneurship. San Francisco: ICS Press.
Blauner, R. (1972). Racial oppression in America. New York: Harper and Row.
Bluestone, B. (1979). The tripartite economy: labor-markets and the working poor. Poverty
and Human Resources Abstracts (Supplement), 5, 15-35.
Bogardus, E. S. (1930). A race-relations cycle. American Journal of Sociology, 35, 612-17.
Bonacich, E. (1973). A theory of middleman minorities. American Sociological Review, 38.
583-94.
Bonacich, E. (1978). U.S. capitalism and Korean immigrant small business.
Mimeographed. Riverside, CA: University of California.
Bonacich, E. & Modell, J. (1980). The economic basis of ethnic solidarity: small
business in the Japanese American community. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Boswell, T. E. (1986). A split labor-market analysis of discrimination against Chinese
immigrants, 1850-1882. American Sociological Review. 51. 352-371.
Burawoy, M. (1976). The function and reproduction of migrant labor: comparative material
from Southern Africa and the United States. American Journal of Sociology. 81. 1050-87.
Carmichael, S., & Hamilton, V. C. (1967). Black power: The politics of liberation in
America. New York: Vintage Press.

29
Chiswick, B. R. (1992). [mmigration, language, and ethnicity: Canada and the United States.
Washington, D. C.: The American F.nterprise Institute.
Clark, J. M., Lasaga, J. I. & Reque, R. S. (1981). The 1980 Exodus: An assessment and
prospect. Washington, D. C.: Council for Inter-American Security.
Cohen, A. (1969). Custom and politics in urban Africa. Berkeley: University of California
Press.
Cummings, S., (Ed.). (1980). Self-help in urban America: Patterns of minority business
enterprise. Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press.
Dan, H. (2000, March). Assimilation, human capital, and earnings of minorities in the United
States in relation to social context: A multilevel analysis of economic attainment of Chinese workers
(Doctoral dissertation, Texas A&M University, 1999). Dissertation Abstracts International. 60. (9),
3538-A.
Doeringer, P. B. & Piore, M. J. (1971). Internal labor markets and manpower analysis.
Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath.
Dye, T. R. (1983). Who is running America?. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Edwards, R. C. (1975). The social relations of production in the firm and labor market
structure. Labor Market Segmentation. Pp. 3-26. Edwards, R. C., Reich, M. & Gordon, M. (Eds.).
Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath.
England, P. (1992). Comparable worth: Theories and evidence. New York: Aldinede Gruyter.
Feagin, J. R. & Feagin, C. B. (1999). Racial and ethnic relations. (6th ed.). Upper Saddle
River, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Galbraith, J. K. (1971). The new industrial state. New York: Mentor Press.
Cans, H. (1962). The urban villagers: Group and class in the life of Italian- Americans. New
York: Free Press.
Gilbertson, G. A. (1995). Women's labor and enclave employment: The case of Dominican
and Colombian women in New York City. International Migration Review. 29, (3), 657-670.
Givens, H. (1939). The Korean community in Los Angeles. M. A. Thesis, Department of
Sociology, University of Southern California.

30

Gold, S. (1988). Refugees and small business: The case of Soviet Jews and Vietnamese.
Ethnic and Racial Studies. H, (4), 411-38.
Gonzalez, C. P. (1965). Le democracia en Mexico. Mexico, D. F: Era Press.
Gordon, D. (1964). Theories of poverty and underemployment: Orthodox, radical, and dual
labor market perspectives. Lexington, MA: Lexington.
Horan, P. M., & Hargis, P. G. (1991). Children's work and schooling in the late nineteenthcentury family economy. American Sociological Review 56, (October), 583-596.
Jones, M. A. (1960). American immigration. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Jorge, A. & Moncarz, R. (1982). The future of Hispanic markets: The Cuban entrepreneur and
the economic development of the Miami SMSA. Discussion Paper in Economics and Banking,
International Banking Center, Florida International University.
Kim, D. Y. (1999, May). Beyond co-ethnic solidarity: Mexican and Ecuadorian employment
in Korean-owned businesses in New York. Ethnic and Racial Studies. Volume 1, 22. (3), 581-606.
Kim, I. (1981). New urban immigrants: The Korean community in New York.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Larzelere, A. (1988). Castro's ploy—America's dilemma: The 1980 Cuban boatlift.
Washington, D. C.: National Defense University Press.
Lavender, R. & Gill, J. (2001). Diversity drives Hall's gain: Immigration S. Hall boom spark
county's rising numbers. [WWW document] URL
www.gainesvilletimes.com/communities/census2000/20010605/644282.html.
Lee, D. O. (1995). Koreatown and Korean small firms in Los Angeles: Locating in the ethnic
neighborhoods. Professional Geographer. 47. (2). 185-195.
Li, P. S. (2000). Economic returns of immigrants' self-employment. Canadian Journal of
Sociology/Cashiers canadiens de sociologie. 25. (1), 1-34.
Light, I. H. (1972). Ethnic enterprise in America: Business and welfare among Chinese.
Japanese, and blacks. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Light, 1. H. (1980). Asian enterprise in America. Pp. 33-57 in S. Cummings (Ed.), Self Help
in Urban America: Patterns of Minority Business Enterprise. Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press.

31

Light, 1. H. & Gold, S. J. (2000). Ethnic economies. San Diego: Academic Press.
Long, R. E., (Ed). (1992). Immigration to the United States, Volume 4, (4), New York: The
H. W. Wilson Company.
Malcolm X. (1967). Malcolm X on Afro-American history. New York: Merit Press.
McMurrer, D. P. (1998). Gettint; ahead: Economic and social mobility in America.
Washington D. C.: Urban Institute Press.
Mills, C. R. (1956). The power elite. New York: Oxford University Press.
Min, P. G. (1996). Caught in the middle: Korean communities in New York and Los Angeles.
Berkeley: University of California Press.
Mincer, J. (1970). The distribution of labor incomes: A survey with special reference to the
human capital approach. Journal of Economic Literature, 8, 1-26.
National Research Council: Committee on National Statistics and Committee on Population.
(1996). Statistics on U.S. immigration: An assessment of data needs for future research. Barry
Edmonston (Ed.). Washington D. C.: National Academy Press.
Nee, V. & Nee, B. B. (1973). Longtime Califom': A documentary history of an American
Chinatown. New York: Pantheon Press.
Olzak, S. & Nagel, J. (Eds.). (1986). Competitive ethnic relations. Orlando: Academic Press
Inc.
Padilla, F. M. (1987). Puerto Rican Chicago. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame
Press.
Park, R. E. (1926). Our racial frontier on the Pacific. Survey, 56, 192-96.
Park, R. E. & Burgess, E. W. (1921). Introduction to the science of sociology. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
Perez, L. (1986). Cubans in the United States. The Annals of the American Academy of
Political and Social Scientists. 487. 126-137.
Perez-Stable, M. & Uriarte, M. (1993). Cubans and the changing economy of Miami. Pp.
133-159 in R. Morales & F. Bonilla (Eds.), Latinos in a changing U. S. economy: Comparative
perspectives on growing inequality. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.

32

Piore, M. J. (1979). Birds of passage: Migrant labor and industrial societies. New York:
Cambridge University Press.
Portes, A. (1981). Modes of structural incorporation and present theories of immigration.
Global Trends in Migration. New York: CMS Press.
Portes, A. (1982). Immigrants' attainment: An analysis of occupation and earnings among
Cuban exiles in the United States. Pp. 91-111 in Hauser, R. M., Mechanic, D., Haller A., & Hauser, T.
(Eds.), Social Structure and Behavior: Essays in Monor of William Hamilton Sewell. New York:
Academic Press.
Portes, A. (1984). The rise of ethnicity: Perceptions among Cuban exiles in Miami. American
Sociological Review. 49, 383-397.
Portes, A. (1987, October). The social origins of the Cuban enclave economy in Miami.
Sociological Perspectives, 30, 340-372.
Portes, A. (1997). Adaptation process of Cuban (Mariel) and Haitian refiigees in South
Florida. 1983-1987 [computer file]. ICPSR version. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, Department
of Sociology, Program in Comparative and International Development [producer], 1992. Ann Arbor,
MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor],
Portes, A. & Bach, R. L. (1980). Immigrant earnings: Cuban and Mexican immigrants in the
United States. International Migration Review, 14, 15-41.
Portes, A. & Bach, R. L. (1985). Latin joumey: Cuban and Mexican immigrants in the United
States. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Portes, A., Clark, J. M. & Bach, R. L. (1977). The new wave: A statistical profile of recent
Cuban exiles in the United States. Cuban Studies, 7, 1-32.
Portes, A. & Manning, R. D. (1986). Immigrant enclave: Theory and empirical examples. Pp.
47-68 in Olzak, S. & Nagel, J. (Eds.), Competitive Ethnic Relations. New York: Academic Press.
Portes, A. & Manning, R. D. (1991). The immigrant enclave: Theory and empirical examples.
In Norman Yetman (Ed.), Majority and Minority. Boston: Allyn and Bacon Press.
Portes, A., Parker, R. N. & Cobas, J. A. (1980). Assimilation or consciousness: perceptions of
U.S. society among recent Latin American immigrants to the United States. Social Forces. 59, 200-24.

33

Portes, A. & Stepick, A. (1985, August). Unwelcome immigrants: The labor market
experience ot 1980 Cuban and Haitian refugees in South Florida. American Sociological Review, 50,
493-514.
Purcell, E. L. (1995). Social issues in American history series: immigration. Phoenix: Oryx
Press.
Putnam, R. (1995). Bowling alone: America's declining social capital. Journal of Democracy.
6(1). 65-78.
Robertson, I. (1987). Sociology. (3rd ed.). New York: Worth Publishers, Inc.
Sanders, J. N. & Nee, V. (1987, December). Limits of ethnic solidarity in the enclave
economy. American Sociological Review. 52, 745-773.
Sanders, J. N., Nee, V. & Sernau, S. (1994, December). Job transitions in an immigrant
metropolis. American Sociological Review. 59, 849-872.
Sassen-Koob, S. (1978). The international circulation of resources and development: The case
of migrant labor. Development and Change, 9, 509-45.
Sawhill, 1. V. & McMurrer, D. P. (1996, December). Economic mobility in the United States.
[WWW document] URL www.urban.org/author.htm.
Schermerhom, R. A. (1970). Comparative ethnic relations: A framework for theory and
research. New York: Random House.
Schmidt, M. (2000, June 7). Philly's Chinatown leaders plan protest against proposed
ballpark. [HTML document] URL
http://cbs.sportsline.eom/u/wire/stories/0%2C 1169%2C2453615 52%2C00.html.
Semyonov, M. (1988). Local labor markets, ethnic segregation, and socio-economic
inequality. American Sociological Review, 53, 255-266.
Shavit, Y. (1992). Arabs in the Israeli economy: A study of the enclave hypothesis. Israel
Social Science Research. 7 (1&2). 45-66.
Smith, R. C. (1996). Mexicans in New York: membership and incorporation in a new
immigrant community. Pp. 57-103 in Braver, S., & Viera, G. S. (Eds.). Notre Dame, IN: University of
Notre Dame Press.

34

Suro, R. (1996). Watching America's door: The immigration backlash and the new policy
debate. New York: The Twentieth Century Fund Press.
Suttles, G. D. (1968) The social order of the slum: Ethnicity and territory in the inner city.
Chicago: University of"Chicago Press.
United States Immigration and Naturalization Service [INS]. (1984) 1980 annual report.
Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office.
United States Immigration and Naturalization Service [INS]. (2001, August) Statistics.
[WWW document] URL www.ins.usdoi.gov.htm.
Villar, M. (1994, Fall). Hindrances to the development of an ethnic economy among Mexican
migrants. Human Organization. 53, (3), 263-268.
Waldinger, R. (1985). Immigration and industrial change in New York City's apparel
industry. Pp. 323-49 in Tienda, M. & Borjas, G. (Eds.), Hispanics in the U. S. Economy. New York:
Academic Press.
Waldinger, R. (1993). The ethnic enclave debate revisited. International Journal of Urban and
Regional Research. 17. (3), September, 444-452.
Whyte, W. F. (1943). Street corner society. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Wilson, K. & Martin, W. A. (1982). Ethnic enclaves: A comparison of the Cuban and black
economies in Miami. American Journal of Sociology. 88. 135-60.
Wilson, K. & Portes, A. (1980). Immigrant enclaves: An analysis of the labor market of
Cubans in Miami. American Journal of Sociology, 86, 295-319.
Wittke, C. (1952). Refugees of revolution: The German forty-eighters in America.
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
Yoon, 1. (1997). On my own: Korean businesses and race relations in America. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
Zhou, M. (1992). Chinatown: The socioeconomic potential of an urban enclave. Philadelphia:
Temple University Press.
Zhou, M. & Logan, J. (1991). In and out of Chinatown: Residential mobility and segregation
of New York City's Chinese, Social Forces. 70. 387-407.

Zhou, Y. (1998). Beyond ethnic enclaves: Location strategies of Chinese produc
firms in Los Angeles. Economic Geotzraphv. 74, (3), 228-251.

APPENDIX A
Institutional Review Board Letter
To: Todd MacEgan West
Sociology and Anthropology
Cc: Dr. William Smith, Faculty Advisor
Sociology and Anthropology
From: Mr Netl Garretson, Coordinator
Research Oversight Committees (1ACUC71BC/1RB)
Date: December 20, 2001
Subject:

Status of Application for Approval to Utilize Human Subjects in Research

On behalf of the Institutional Review Board (1RB), 1 am writing to inform you that we have completed the review of
your application for approval to utilize human subjects in your proposed research, "Enclave Economies: Pecuniary
Benefits of Ethnic Solidarity for Cuban Emigres in South Florida." It is the determination of the Chair, on behalf of the
Institutional Review Board, that your proposed research adequately protects the rights of human subjects. Your research
is approved in accordance with the Federal Policy for the Protection ofHuman Subjects (45 CFR §46101 (b)(4)), which
states:
(4) Research involving the collection or study of existing data, documents, records, pathological specimens, or diagnostic
specimens, if these sources are publicly available or if the information is recorded in by the investigator in such a manner
that subjects cannot be identified, directly or through identifiers linked to the subjects.
This IRB approval is in effect for one year from the date of this letter. If at the end of that time, there have been no
changes to the exempted research protocol, you may request an extension of the approval period for an additional year In
the interim, please provide the IRB with any information concerning any significant adverse event, whether or not it is
believed to be related to the study, within five working days of the event. In addition, if a change or modification of the
approved methodology becomes necessary, you must notify the IRB Coordinator prior to initiating any such changes or
modifications. At that time, an amended application for IRB approval may be submitted. Upon completion of your data
collection, please notify the IRB Coordinator so that your file may be closed
Oversight Coordinator
Research Oversight Committees
Georgia Southern University
PO Box 8005
Statesboro, GA 30460
P: 912-681-5465 F: 912-681-0719
http://www2.gasou.edu/research/Resources/
ovrsighKo! gasou.edu

